There are no criminals 15 and below

And that is because under the Juvenile and Justice Welfare Act, a child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.  This means that one who is fifteen years of age who kills somebody with cruelty and evident premeditation cannot be called a murderer for after all, he is just a child in conflict with the law.  Yeah, he did not do anything wrong, he's just conflicted and it's just unfortunate that somebody died because of it.  Don't worry, we'll make the parents pay, literally.

You should thank your Senator Kiko Pangilinan for this law.  Now syndicates can utilize kids within this age bracket in committing crimes so don't be surprised if members of the Akyat Bahay Gang or the Bukas Kotse Gang are now required to be 15 and below.

Apparently the ones responsible for this law believe that one from the ages of ten to fifteen cannot  possibly discern whether or not its wrong to kill another human being.  I wonder what became their basis for such a conclusion...  perhaps their own childhood.

Prudential Bank vs IAC

PRUDENTIAL BANK vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 74886 December 8, 1992,  216 scra 257

--presentment for payment

FACTS:

Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. entered into a contract with Nissho Co., Ltd. of Japan for the importation of textile machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan.  To effect payment for said machineries, Philippine Rayon Mills opened a commercial letter of credit with the Prudential Bank and Trust Company in favor of Nissho.  Against this letter of credit, drafts were drawn and issued by Nissho, which were all paid by the Prudential Bank through its correspondent in Japan.  Two of these drafts were accepted by Philippine Rayon Mills while the others were not.  Petitioner instituted an action for the recovery of the sum of money it paid to Nissho as Philippine Rayon Mills was not able to pay its obligations arising from the letter of credit.  Respondent court ruled that with regard to the ten drafts which were not presented and accepted, no valid demand for payment can be made.  Petitioner however claims that the drafts were sight drafts which did not require presentment for acceptance to Philippine Rayon.

ISSUE:

Whether presentment for acceptance of the drafts was indispensable to make Philippine Rayon liable thereon.

RULING:

In the case at bar, the drawee was necessarily the herein petitioner. It was to the latter that the drafts were presented for payment.  There was in fact no need for acceptance as the issued drafts are sight drafts.   Presentment for acceptance is necessary only in the cases expressly provided for in Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL).  The said section provides that presentment for acceptance must be made:

         (a) Where the bill is payable after sight, or in any other case, where presentment for acceptance is necessary in order to fix the maturity of the instrument; or

         (b) Where the bill expressly stipulates that it shall be presented for acceptance; or

         (c) Where the bill is drawn payable elsewhere than at the residence or place of business of the drawee.

In no other case is presentment for acceptance necessary in order to render any party to the bill liable.  Obviously then, sight drafts do not require presentment for acceptance.

Stelco vs CA

Stelco Marketing vs. CA

GR 96160, 17 June 1992, 210 scra 51

--accommodation party

FACTS:

Stelco Marketing Corporation sold structural steel bars to RYL Construction Inc.  RYL gave Stelco’s “sister corporation,” Armstrong Industries, a MetroBank check from Steelweld Corporation.  The check was issued by Steelweld’s President  to Romeo Lim, President of RYL, by way of accommodation, as a guaranty and not in payment of an obligation.  When Armstrong deposited the check at its bank, it was dishonored because it was drawn against insufficient funds. When so deposited, the check bore two indorsements, i.e. RYL and Armstrong.  Subsequently, Stelco filed a civil case against RYL and Steelweld to recover the value of the steel products.

ISSUE:

Whether Steelweld as an accommodating party can be held liable by Stelco for the dishonored check.

RULING:

Steelweld may be held liable but not by Stelco.  Under Section 29 of the NIL, Steelweld Corp. can be held liable for having issued the subject check for the accommodation of Romeo Lim.  An accommodation party is one who has singed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving valued therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder, at the time of taking the instrument, knew him to be only an accommodation party.   Stelco however, cannot be deemed a holder of the check for value as it does not meet two essential requisites prescribed by statute, i.e. that it did not become “the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored,” and that it did not take the check “in good faith and for value.”

Francisco vs CA

ADALIA FRANCISCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 116320 November 29, 1999 

--agents

FACTS:

A. Francisco Realty & Development Corporation (AFRDC), of which petitioner Francisco is the president, entered into a Land Development and Construction Contract with private respondent Herby Commercial & Construction Corporation (HCCC), represented by its President and General Manager private respondent Ong.  Under the contract, HCCC was to be paid on the basis of the completed houses and developed lands delivered to and accepted by AFRDC and the GSIS.  Sometime in 1979, Ong discovered that Diaz and Francisco, the Vice-President of GSIS, had executed and signed seven checks of various dates and amounts payable to HCCC for completed and delivered work under the contract. Ong, however, claims that these checks were never delivered to HCCC.  It turned out that Francisco forged the indorsement of Ong on the checks and indorsed the checks for a second time by signing her name at the back of the checks, petitioner then deposited said checks in her savings account.  A case was brought by private respondents against petitioner to recover the value of said checks.  Petitioner however claims that she was authorized to sign Ong's name on the checks by virtue of the Certification executed by Ong in her favor giving her the authority to collect all the receivables of HCCC from the GSIS, including the questioned checks.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner cannot be held liable on the questioned checks by virtue of the Certification executed by Ong giving her the authority to collect such checks from the GSIS.

RULING:

Petitioner is liable.  The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that where any person is under obligation to indorse in a representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms as to negative personal liability.  An agent, when so signing, should indicate that he is merely signing in behalf of the principal and must disclose the name of his principal; otherwise he shall be held personally liable.  Even assuming that Francisco was authorized by HCCC to sign Ong's name, still, Francisco did not indorse the instrument in accordance with law. Instead of signing Ong's name, Francisco should have signed her own name and expressly indicated that she was signing as an agent of HCCC. Thus, the Certification cannot be used by Francisco to validate her act of forgery.

PBCom vs Aruego

Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Aruego

GR L-25836-37, 31 January 1981,  102 scra 530

--agents

FACTS:

To facilitate payment of the printing of a periodical called “World Current Events.”, Aruego, its publisher, obtained a credit accommodation from the Philippine Bank of Commerce. For every printing of the periodical, the printer collected the cost of printing by drawing a draft against the bank, said draft being sent later to Aruego for acceptance. As an added security for the payment of the amounts advanced to the printer, the bank also required Aruego to execute a trust receipt in favor of the bank wherein Aruego undertook to hold in trust for the bank the periodicals and to sell the same with the promise to turn over to the bank the proceeds of the sale to answer for the payment of all obligations arising from the draft. The bank instituted an action against Aruego to recover the cost of printing of the latter’s periodical.  Aruego however argues that he signed the supposed bills of exchange only as an agent of the Philippine Education Foundation Company where he is president.

ISSUES:

Whether Aruego can be held liable by the petitioner although he signed the supposed bills of exchange only as an agent of Philippine Education Foundation Company.

RULING:

Aruego did not disclose in any of the drafts that he accepted that he was signing as representative of the Philippine Education Foundation Company. For failure to disclose his principal, Aruego is personally liable for the drafts he accepted, pursuant to Section 20 of the NIL which provides that when a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized; but the mere addition of words describing him as an agent or as filing a representative character, without disclosing his principal, does not exempt him from personal liability.

Dev't Bank of Rizal vs Sima Wei

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF RIZAL vs. SIMA WEI, ET AL.

G.R. No. 85419 March 9, 1993

--complete undelivered

FACTS:

Respondent Sima Wei executed and delivered to petitioner Bank a promissory note engaging to pay the petitioner Bank or order the amount of P1,820,000.00.  Sima Wei subsequently issued two crossed checks payable to petitioner Bank drawn against China Banking Corporation in full settlement of the drawer's account evidenced by the promissory note.  These two checks however were not delivered to the petitioner-payee or to any of its authorized representatives but instead came into the possession of respondent Lee Kian Huat, who deposited the checks without the petitioner-payee's indorsement to the account of respondent Plastic Corporation with Producers Bank.  Inspite of the fact that the checks were crossed and payable to petitioner Bank and bore no indorsement of the latter, the Branch Manager of Producers Bank authorized the acceptance of the checks for deposit and credited them to the account of said Plastic Corporation.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner Bank has a cause of action against Sima Wei for the undelivered checks.

RULING:

No.  A negotiable instrument must be delivered to the payee in order to evidence its existence as a binding contract.  Section 16 of the NIL provides that every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto.  Thus, the payee of a negotiable instrument acquires no interest with respect thereto until its delivery to him.  Without the initial delivery of the instrument from the drawer to the payee, there can be no liability on the instrument.  Petitioner however has a right of action against Sima Wei for the balance due on the promissory note.